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Slippage Protection for AI Agents: MEV, Sandwiching, and Frontrunning

By Purple Flea Engineering March 4, 2026 17 min read

MEV bots extract over $1 billion annually from DeFi traders โ€” and AI agents are lucrative targets because they trade programmatically and predictably. This guide covers the complete MEV taxonomy, the precise mechanics of sandwich attacks, how to detect frontrunning attempts in real-time, and how to build a slippage-protected swap agent using Python and Purple Flea's Trading API.

Table of Contents

  1. MEV Taxonomy
  2. Sandwich Attack Mechanics
  3. Protection Strategies
  4. Slippage-Protected Swap Agent
  5. Purple Flea Integration
  6. Real-Time MEV Detection
01 โ€” MEV Taxonomy

MEV Taxonomy: Know Your Adversary

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) refers to value extracted by block producers (validators, sequencers) or specialized bots by reordering, inserting, or censoring transactions within a block. The term originally stood for "Miner Extractable Value" from the PoW era. Post-merge Ethereum and other PoS chains use the updated term, but the mechanics remain the same.

$1.2B Annual MEV extracted
~68% From DEX arbitrage
~19% From sandwich attacks
<1ms Bot reaction time

MEV Attack Types Affecting AI Agents

๐Ÿฅช

Sandwich Attacks

Bot places a buy before your transaction and a sell after it. Your trade moves the price, bot profits from the spread at your expense.

๐Ÿƒ

Frontrunning

Bot detects your pending transaction and submits the same trade with higher gas, executing first and leaving you with worse price.

๐Ÿ”™

Backrunning

Bot executes arbitrage immediately after a known large transaction that moves prices, correcting imbalances and taking the profit.

๐Ÿงน

Liquidation Racing

Multiple bots compete to execute liquidations. Winning bot extracts liquidation bonus; losing agents pay gas for failed attempts.

โš ๏ธ
AI agents are premium targets for MEV bots

Bots monitor mempool for patterns. Agents that submit large swaps at regular intervals (e.g., every hour, always the same token pair) are trivially detectable and will be consistently sandwiched once identified. Vary your timing, size, and routing.

02 โ€” Sandwich Attack Mechanics

Sandwich Attack Mechanics: Step by Step

A sandwich attack is elegant and brutal. It exploits the deterministic price impact of AMM swaps (Uniswap, Curve, Balancer) to extract value from any transaction that moves the price enough to be profitable after gas costs.

BOT
Step 1: Mempool Detection Bot monitors public mempool. Detects your pending swap: "Agent buying 50,000 USDC of ETH with 0.5% slippage tolerance."
BOT
Step 2: Frontrun (Buy) Bot calculates optimal frontrun size: buy enough ETH to move the price close to your slippage limit. Submits buy with gas price = your gas + 1 wei. Bot's transaction executes immediately before yours.
VICTIM
Step 3: Your Transaction Executes at Worst Price Your swap executes at the elevated price (bot's buy moved it up). You receive fewer ETH than the mid-market quote. The trade succeeds (within your slippage tolerance) but at maximum disadvantage.
BOT
Step 4: Backrun (Sell) Bot immediately sells the ETH it bought, now that your trade has provided liquidity at the elevated price. Bot's sell price is higher than its buy price. Profit extracted.
PROFIT
Step 5: Net Extraction Bot profit = your price impact minus gas costs for two transactions. On a $50K swap, extraction can be $50-$500 depending on pool liquidity and slippage tolerance.

The Math Behind Sandwich Profitability

  Pool state before attack:  ETH/USDC = $3,200  (liquidity: $10M)

  Agent intent:  Buy $50,000 of ETH (expect ~15.6 ETH at $3,200)
  Agent slippage: 0.5% max โ†’ accept down to $3,216/ETH (i.e., get at least 15.52 ETH)

  Bot frontrun analysis:
  โ”Œโ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”
  โ”‚ How much ETH can bot buy before price hits $3,216?           โ”‚
  โ”‚                                                              โ”‚
  โ”‚ AMM price impact formula (x*y=k):                           โ”‚
  โ”‚   k = ETH_reserve * USDC_reserve = 3125 ETH * $10M          โ”‚
  โ”‚   Target price: $3,216                                      โ”‚
  โ”‚   Bot can buy: ~93 ETH (~$297,000) to move price to limit   โ”‚
  โ”‚                                                              โ”‚
  โ”‚ But bot optimizes for profit, not for max size:              โ”‚
  โ”‚   Optimal frontrun: ~$20,000 buy โ†’ price moves to ~$3,210   โ”‚
  โ”‚   Bot's ETH gain: 6.22 ETH avg at ~$3,204                   โ”‚
  โ””โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”€โ”˜

  After agent's $50K buy:
  โ†’ Price moves from $3,210 โ†’ $3,228
  โ†’ Agent receives 15.52 ETH (within 0.5% slippage) โ† SUCCESS for agent
  โ†’ But paid $3,216 avg instead of $3,200 = $250 extra cost

  Bot backrun sells 6.22 ETH at $3,225:
  โ†’ Bot sell proceeds: ~$20,050
  โ†’ Bot buy cost:      ~$19,900
  โ†’ Bot profit:        ~$150 (minus ~$30 in gas = $120 net)
  โ†’ Victim loss:       $250 in price impact + gas

  TOTAL MEV EXTRACTED: $120 from agent in a single transaction.
      
Figure 1: Sandwich attack math on a $50,000 ETH buy

Why Slippage Tolerance Is a Double-Edged Sword

Setting slippage tolerance high (e.g., 1-3%) protects you from transaction failures due to legitimate price movement. But it also gives MEV bots a wider target: the wider your tolerance, the larger the sandwich they can profit from.

Setting slippage too low (e.g., 0.1%) causes frequent transaction failures when real price movement happens. The optimal slippage is the minimum that allows your transaction to succeed given normal volatility โ€” typically 0.3-0.5% for major pairs, higher for illiquid pairs.

03 โ€” Protection Strategies

Protection Strategies

MEV protection is an arms race. No single technique is foolproof, but layering multiple defenses dramatically reduces extraction.

Strategy How It Works Effectiveness Trade-off
Private RPC / Flashbots Protect Bypass public mempool; submit directly to validators Very High Slower confirmation, limited chain support
Tight slippage tolerance Reduces bot's extractable range Medium Higher failure rate on volatile pairs
Transaction splitting Break large swaps into smaller ones over time Medium More gas cost, slower execution
Commit-reveal patterns Hide swap intent until execution block High Requires 2 transactions, extra complexity
Timing randomization Vary submission times to avoid bot detection Low-Medium Slight execution delay
Aggregator routing (1inch, etc) Split across multiple pools, reduces single-pool impact Medium Aggregator complexity, some extra gas
Purple Flea Trading API Built-in slippage protection + MEV-resistant routing High API dependency

Flashbots Protect vs. Other Private RPCs

Flashbots Protect (rpc.flashbots.net) is the most widely used MEV protection service on Ethereum mainnet. Transactions submitted through it bypass the public mempool and go directly to Flashbots block builders, who cannot profitably sandwich them (they would be sandwiching themselves).

However, Flashbots Protect only covers Ethereum mainnet. For MATIC, BNB, AVAX, agents need chain-specific solutions: BloxRoute for BNB Chain, Boba for some L2s, or Purple Flea's routing which handles MEV protection internally across all supported chains.

โ„น๏ธ
The "deadline" parameter is critical

Every DEX swap has a deadline parameter โ€” if the transaction is not included by that block, it reverts. Setting a very short deadline (current block + 1) prevents bots from holding your transaction and executing it later when conditions are worse. Always set deadlines aggressively.

04 โ€” Slippage-Protected Swap Agent

Python Implementation: Slippage-Protected Swap Agent

The following agent implements multi-layer MEV protection: tight dynamic slippage calculation, mempool monitoring for sandwich detection, transaction splitting for large orders, and integration with Purple Flea's Trading API.

Python slippage_protected_agent.py
"""
Slippage-Protected Swap Agent with MEV detection.
Uses Purple Flea Trading API for MEV-resistant execution.
"""

import asyncio
import logging
import random
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
import aiohttp
import statistics

log = logging.getLogger('swap_agent')

PURPLEFLEA_TRADING = "https://purpleflea.com/trading-api"
API_KEY = "your_api_key_here"

# MEV detection thresholds
MEMPOOL_SCAN_INTERVAL_S = 1.0
SANDWICH_DETECTION_WINDOW = 5      # seconds to monitor before submitting
GAS_SPIKE_MULTIPLIER     = 2.5     # gas spike above median โ†’ possible bot activity
FRONTRUN_PRICE_MOVE_PCT  = 0.002   # 0.2% mid-price move in last 30s โ†’ delay

# Swap settings
LARGE_ORDER_THRESHOLD_USD = 10_000  # split orders above this size
SPLIT_CHUNK_USD           = 3_000   # chunk size for split orders
SPLIT_DELAY_S             = 12      # ~1 block between chunks
MAX_SLIPPAGE_BPS          = 50      # 0.50% absolute max slippage
MIN_SLIPPAGE_BPS          = 10      # 0.10% absolute min slippage


@dataclass
class MarketSnapshot:
    pair: str
    mid_price: float
    bid: float
    ask: float
    pool_depth_usd: float
    recent_prices: List[float]
    avg_gas_gwei: float
    timestamp: float


@dataclass
class SwapResult:
    tx_hash: str
    pair: str
    input_amount: float
    output_amount: float
    effective_price: float
    slippage_bps: int
    mev_risk_at_submission: str
    timestamp: float


class MEVDetector:
    """Heuristics for detecting active MEV bot presence before a swap."""

    def __init__(self):
        self.price_history: Dict[str, List[Tuple[float, float]]] = {}  # pair โ†’ [(ts, price)]
        self.gas_history: List[float] = []

    def update(self, snapshot: MarketSnapshot):
        pair = snapshot.pair
        if pair not in self.price_history:
            self.price_history[pair] = []

        now = time.time()
        self.price_history[pair].append((now, snapshot.mid_price))
        self.gas_history.append(snapshot.avg_gas_gwei)

        # Keep only last 60 seconds
        cutoff = now - 60
        self.price_history[pair] = [(t, p) for t, p in self.price_history[pair] if t > cutoff]
        if len(self.gas_history) > 60:
            self.gas_history = self.gas_history[-60:]

    def mev_risk(self, pair: str, trade_size_usd: float) -> Tuple[str, str]:
        """
        Returns (risk_level, reason) where risk_level in {LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH}.
        """
        reasons = []

        # Check 1: Recent price volatility (possible frontrunning in progress)
        history = self.price_history.get(pair, [])
        if len(history) >= 3:
            recent_window = [(t, p) for t, p in history if time.time() - t < 30]
            if len(recent_window) >= 2:
                prices = [p for _, p in recent_window]
                price_move_pct = abs(prices[-1] - prices[0]) / prices[0]
                if price_move_pct > FRONTRUN_PRICE_MOVE_PCT:
                    reasons.append(f"Price moved {price_move_pct:.2%} in 30s")

        # Check 2: Gas spike (bots bidding up to frontrun)
        if len(self.gas_history) >= 5:
            median_gas = statistics.median(self.gas_history[:-3])
            current_gas = self.gas_history[-1]
            if current_gas > median_gas * GAS_SPIKE_MULTIPLIER:
                reasons.append(f"Gas spiked {current_gas:.1f} vs median {median_gas:.1f} gwei")

        # Check 3: Trade size relative to pool depth
        pool_depth = self.price_history.get(pair, [])
        impact_estimate = trade_size_usd / 1_000_000  # rough 0.1% per $10K in $10M pool
        if impact_estimate > 0.003:  # > 0.3% impact
            reasons.append(f"High price impact: ~{impact_estimate:.1%}")

        if len(reasons) >= 2:
            return "HIGH", "; ".join(reasons)
        elif len(reasons) == 1:
            return "MEDIUM", reasons[0]
        return "LOW", "normal conditions"


class SlippageCalculator:
    """Dynamic slippage tolerance based on pool conditions."""

    @staticmethod
    def optimal_slippage(
        trade_usd: float,
        pool_depth_usd: float,
        recent_volatility_pct: float,
        mev_risk: str,
    ) -> int:
        """Return optimal slippage tolerance in basis points."""
        # Base slippage from price impact
        impact_bps = int((trade_usd / pool_depth_usd) * 10_000 * 2)  # rough AMM formula

        # Volatility buffer: allow for price movement during block time
        volatility_bps = int(recent_volatility_pct * 10_000 * 2)

        base = max(MIN_SLIPPAGE_BPS, impact_bps + volatility_bps)

        # Reduce tolerance under high MEV conditions to limit extraction
        if mev_risk == "HIGH":
            base = min(base, MIN_SLIPPAGE_BPS + 10)  # tighten to ~20 bps under attack
        elif mev_risk == "MEDIUM":
            base = min(base, 30)

        return min(base, MAX_SLIPPAGE_BPS)


class ProtectedSwapAgent:
    def __init__(self, api_key: str):
        self.api_key = api_key
        self.detector = MEVDetector()
        self.calc = SlippageCalculator()
        self._session: Optional[aiohttp.ClientSession] = None

    async def __aenter__(self):
        self._session = aiohttp.ClientSession(
            headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {self.api_key}"}
        )
        return self

    async def __aexit__(self, *args):
        await self._session.close()

    async def get_market(self, pair: str) -> MarketSnapshot:
        """Fetch current market data for MEV assessment."""
        async with self._session.get(
            f"{PURPLEFLEA_TRADING}/market/{pair}"
        ) as resp:
            resp.raise_for_status()
            d = await resp.json()
        return MarketSnapshot(
            pair=pair,
            mid_price=d["mid"],
            bid=d["bid"],
            ask=d["ask"],
            pool_depth_usd=d.get("pool_depth_usd", 5_000_000),
            recent_prices=d.get("recent_prices", []),
            avg_gas_gwei=d.get("avg_gas_gwei", 20),
            timestamp=time.time(),
        )

    async def _execute_single_swap(
        self,
        pair: str,
        side: str,
        amount_usd: float,
        slippage_bps: int,
        mev_risk: str,
    ) -> SwapResult:
        """Execute a single swap chunk via Purple Flea Trading API.
        The API routes through MEV-resistant channels automatically."""

        # Randomize timing slightly to avoid bot pattern detection (ยฑ2 seconds)
        jitter = random.uniform(-2, 2)
        if jitter > 0:
            await asyncio.sleep(jitter)

        payload = {
            "pair":         pair,
            "side":         side,
            "amount_usd":   amount_usd,
            "slippage_bps": slippage_bps,
            "mev_protect":  True,     # Enable Purple Flea MEV protection
            "deadline_s":   30,       # Expire if not included in 30s
        }

        async with self._session.post(
            f"{PURPLEFLEA_TRADING}/swap", json=payload
        ) as resp:
            resp.raise_for_status()
            data = await resp.json()

        return SwapResult(
            tx_hash=data["tx_hash"],
            pair=pair,
            input_amount=amount_usd,
            output_amount=float(data["output_amount"]),
            effective_price=float(data["effective_price"]),
            slippage_bps=int(data["actual_slippage_bps"]),
            mev_risk_at_submission=mev_risk,
            timestamp=time.time(),
        )

    async def swap(self, pair: str, side: str, amount_usd: float) -> List[SwapResult]:
        """
        Execute a fully protected swap with:
        - MEV risk assessment
        - Dynamic slippage calculation
        - Order splitting for large trades
        - Timing randomization
        """
        results = []

        # Pre-trade market scan
        snapshot = await self.get_market(pair)
        self.detector.update(snapshot)

        # Compute recent volatility from price history
        prices = snapshot.recent_prices
        recent_vol = 0.0
        if len(prices) >= 2:
            returns = [abs(prices[i] / prices[i-1] - 1) for i in range(1, len(prices))]
            recent_vol = statistics.mean(returns)

        mev_risk, mev_reason = self.detector.mev_risk(pair, amount_usd)
        log.info(f"MEV risk: {mev_risk} โ€” {mev_reason}")

        # If HIGH risk, wait for conditions to improve (up to 2 minutes)
        if mev_risk == "HIGH":
            log.warning(f"HIGH MEV risk detected. Waiting up to 2 minutes...")
            for _ in range(12):
                await asyncio.sleep(10)
                snapshot = await self.get_market(pair)
                self.detector.update(snapshot)
                mev_risk, mev_reason = self.detector.mev_risk(pair, amount_usd)
                if mev_risk != "HIGH":
                    log.info(f"MEV risk reduced to {mev_risk}, proceeding")
                    break

        slippage_bps = self.calc.optimal_slippage(
            trade_usd=min(amount_usd, LARGE_ORDER_THRESHOLD_USD),
            pool_depth_usd=snapshot.pool_depth_usd,
            recent_volatility_pct=recent_vol,
            mev_risk=mev_risk,
        )
        log.info(f"Dynamic slippage: {slippage_bps} bps")

        # Split large orders
        if amount_usd > LARGE_ORDER_THRESHOLD_USD:
            chunks = []
            remaining = amount_usd
            while remaining > 0:
                chunk = min(remaining, SPLIT_CHUNK_USD)
                chunks.append(chunk)
                remaining -= chunk

            log.info(f"Splitting ${amount_usd:,.0f} into {len(chunks)} chunks")
            for i, chunk in enumerate(chunks):
                result = await self._execute_single_swap(pair, side, chunk, slippage_bps, mev_risk)
                results.append(result)
                log.info(f"Chunk {i+1}/{len(chunks)} executed: {result.tx_hash[:10]}...")
                if i < len(chunks) - 1:
                    await asyncio.sleep(SPLIT_DELAY_S)
        else:
            result = await self._execute_single_swap(pair, side, amount_usd, slippage_bps, mev_risk)
            results.append(result)

        total_output = sum(r.output_amount for r in results)
        avg_slippage = sum(r.slippage_bps for r in results) / len(results)
        log.info(f"Swap complete. Total output: {total_output:.4f}, avg slippage: {avg_slippage:.0f} bps")
        return results


# Usage example
async def main():
    async with ProtectedSwapAgent(API_KEY) as agent:
        # Buy $25,000 of ETH with full MEV protection
        results = await agent.swap(
            pair="ETH/USDC",
            side="buy",
            amount_usd=25_000,
        )
        for r in results:
            print(f"tx: {r.tx_hash}")
            print(f"  output: {r.output_amount:.4f} ETH")
            print(f"  slippage: {r.slippage_bps} bps")
            print(f"  MEV risk was: {r.mev_risk_at_submission}")


if __name__ == "__main__":
    asyncio.run(main())
05 โ€” Purple Flea Integration

Purple Flea Trading API: Built-In Slippage Protection

Purple Flea's Trading API at purpleflea.com/trading-api includes MEV protection as a first-class feature. When mev_protect: true is passed with any swap, the API automatically routes through the appropriate private transaction network for each chain.

Chain MEV Protection Route Latency Impact Notes
Ethereum Flashbots Protect + MEV Blocker +1-3 blocks Most mature protection ecosystem
Polygon Flashbots (Polygon validators) +2-5 blocks Less validators = slightly higher risk
BNB Chain BloxRoute BDN +1-2 blocks BloxRoute has good BNB validator relationships
Avalanche Direct validator submission +1-3 blocks AvalancheGo validator network is smaller

Trading API: Perpetuals, Spot, and Options

For agents running perpetual futures or options through the Trading API, MEV risk is different. Perpetuals use oracle prices rather than AMM pools, so sandwich attacks don't apply directly. However, frontrunning is still possible on funding rate arbitrage โ€” and Purple Flea's perp trading routes through MEV-resistant order submission by default.

โœ…
Enable mev_protect: true on all spot swaps

There is no fee for MEV protection through the Purple Flea Trading API. The only trade-off is ~1-3 additional blocks of confirmation latency. For agents that are not executing in sub-second time windows, always enable it. The protection is worth far more than the latency cost.

06 โ€” Real-Time MEV Detection

Real-Time MEV Monitoring Heuristics

Beyond protecting individual transactions, agents should continuously monitor their own transaction history for signs of successful MEV extraction. This helps calibrate slippage tolerance over time and detect if a specific bot has targeted the agent's address.

Python mev_monitor.py
import aiohttp
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import List, Optional

@dataclass
class SandwichEvidence:
    victim_tx: str
    frontrun_tx: str
    backrun_tx: str
    estimated_extraction_usd: float
    attacker_address: str


async def detect_sandwich_in_block(
    block_number: int,
    agent_address: str,
    web3_session: aiohttp.ClientSession,
    rpc_url: str,
) -> List[SandwichEvidence]:
    """
    Analyze a block for sandwich attacks against agent_address.

    Looks for pattern:
    [some_address buys TOKEN_A] โ†’ [agent_address swaps] โ†’ [some_address sells TOKEN_A]
    where some_address is the same in both surrounding txs.
    """
    async def rpc(method, params):
        async with web3_session.post(rpc_url, json={
            "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "method": method, "params": params
        }) as r:
            data = await r.json()
            return data["result"]

    # Get full block with transactions
    block = await rpc("eth_getBlockByNumber", [hex(block_number), True])
    txs = block["transactions"]

    # Find agent's transactions in this block
    agent_txs = [
        (i, tx) for i, tx in enumerate(txs)
        if tx["from"].lower() == agent_address.lower()
    ]

    evidence = []
    for agent_idx, agent_tx in agent_txs:
        # Check transactions immediately before and after
        if agent_idx == 0 or agent_idx == len(txs) - 1:
            continue

        before_tx = txs[agent_idx - 1]
        after_tx  = txs[agent_idx + 1]

        # Sandwich pattern: same sender for before and after tx
        if before_tx["from"].lower() == after_tx["from"].lower():
            # Check that both are DEX interactions (simplified: non-zero input data)
            if len(before_tx["input"]) > 10 and len(after_tx["input"]) > 10:
                # Estimate extraction (requires tx receipt analysis; simplified here)
                log.warning(
                    f"SANDWICH DETECTED in block {block_number}:"
                    f" {before_tx['hash'][:10]}... โ†’ agent โ†’ {after_tx['hash'][:10]}..."
                )
                evidence.append(SandwichEvidence(
                    victim_tx=agent_tx["hash"],
                    frontrun_tx=before_tx["hash"],
                    backrun_tx=after_tx["hash"],
                    estimated_extraction_usd=-1,  # requires deeper receipt analysis
                    attacker_address=before_tx["from"],
                ))

    return evidence


async def mev_monitoring_loop(agent_address: str, rpc_url: str):
    """Continuously monitor recent blocks for MEV extraction events."""
    last_block = 0
    total_events = 0

    async with aiohttp.ClientSession() as session:
        while True:
            try:
                # Get current block
                async with session.post(rpc_url, json={
                    "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1,
                    "method": "eth_blockNumber", "params": []
                }) as r:
                    data = await r.json()
                    current_block = int(data["result"], 16)

                if current_block > last_block:
                    sandwiches = await detect_sandwich_in_block(
                        current_block, agent_address, session, rpc_url
                    )
                    total_events += len(sandwiches)
                    if total_events > 5:
                        log.error(
                            f"Agent sandwiched {total_events} times recently."
                            f" CONSIDER enabling Purple Flea MEV protection or"
                            f" switching to private RPC submission."
                        )
                    last_block = current_block

            except Exception as e:
                log.error(f"MEV monitor error: {e}")

            await asyncio.sleep(13)  # ~1 ETH block time
โšก
If you are being consistently sandwiched, change your behavior immediately

Once a MEV bot has identified your address and trading patterns, it will continue extracting as long as you are predictable. Change your RPC endpoint, enable MEV protection, vary your swap sizes and timing. If using Purple Flea Trading API, contact support to enable enhanced routing.

Trade Without MEV Tax

Purple Flea's Trading API routes through MEV-resistant infrastructure across ETH, MATIC, BNB, and AVAX. Enable mev_protect: true on every swap.